BYU Law Review
Volume 2003 | Issue 1

Article 8

3-1-2003

Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive
Gambling: Punishing the Pathological or
Pardoning the Common Criminal?
Justin W. Starr

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Gaming Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Justin W. Starr, Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive Gambling: Punishing the Pathological or Pardoning the Common
Criminal?, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 385 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2003/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

STA-FIN

2/15/2003 2:59 PM

Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive
Gambling: Punishing the Pathological or Pardoning
the Common Criminal?
I. INTRODUCTION
A grandmother from New York City was sentenced yesterday to
31 months in federal prison and ordered to pay back the nearly
$4.9 million she embezzled from her former employer to feed her
gambling habit in Atlantic City.
...
From the judge, she asked for mercy.
To some extent, mercy had already been shown.
Checoura could have received substantially more prison time,
but [the judge] agreed last month to apply a sparingly used portion
of federal law to reduce her sentence. Her compulsive-gambling
disorder, he ruled, “significantly impaired her ability to control her
wrongful behavior.”1

In 1998, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing
Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) were amended to explicitly include
volitional impairments within the diminished capacity guideline.2
Thus, the Sentencing Commission endorsed leniency for those
defendants who, like Checoura, although fully capable of discerning
right from wrong, are perceived as having an impaired ability to
conform their behavior to the law. The compulsion is perceived as so
great that it overpowers the will. Yet, mitigating punishment because
of a perceived volitional impairment raises all the same concerns that
led Congress to reject a volitional insanity defense,3 the primary
concern being that it could not be “reliably administered . . . because
of inherent problems with distinguishing those unable to conform to

1. Rita Giordano, Gambling Embezzler Gets 31 Months in U.S. Prison, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2002, at B5.
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2001).
3. Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
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the law from those unwilling to do so.”4 This Comment will focus
on that concern in the context of compulsive gambling5 as a factor
for downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines. Does a
gambling addiction significantly reduce a person’s capacity to obey
the law? Where does one draw the line between an inability to obey
the law and failure to obey the law, between an irresistible impulse
and an impulse not resisted?
Section II will give a brief account of the Guidelines and the
rationale for the departure guideline. Section III will discuss the
correlation between compulsive gambling and crime. The evidence
shows that compulsive gamblers commit crimes (particularly theft
crimes) at higher rates than the general population. Thus, as greater
access to gambling begets greater numbers of compulsive gamblers,
how sentencing courts will treat compulsive gambling becomes more
important. Section IV will discuss the different ways in which the
diminished capacity guideline has been interpreted regarding
volitional impairments and will suggest that a compromise approach
fashioned by the Seventh Circuit should be followed. Section V will
discuss the difficulties in measuring volitional impairments in general
and compulsive gambling in particular and propose that the evidence
shows that compulsive gambling does not in fact cause a diminished
ability to obey the law. Finally, section VI will discuss the
incompatibility of downward departures based on compulsive
gambling with the Guidelines’ treatment of other factors, particularly
drug and alcohol use and addiction.
The conclusion of this Comment is that requests for downward
departures based on compulsive gambling should not be granted.
The reasons are twofold. First, there is little evidence that compulsive
gambling causes diminished capacity and there is no reliable way of
measuring it even if it does. Second, departures based on compulsive

4. Carlos M. Pelayo, Comment, “Give Me a Break! I Couldn’t Help Myself!”?: Rejecting
Volitional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section
5K2.13, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 735 n.29 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 228 (1983)).
5. The American Psychiatric Association describes pathological gambling as
“[p]ersistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, family, or
vocational pursuits. The gambling pattern may be regular or episodic, and the course of the
disorder is typically chronic.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 312.31 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV], http://
www.behavenet.com/capsules/disorders/pathgambledis.htm. This Comment uses the terms
“pathological gambling,” “compulsive gambling,” and “gambling addiction” interchangeably,
as does the case law.

386

STA-FIN

385]

2/15/2003 2:59 PM

Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive Gambling

gambling are inconsistent with the Guidelines’ policy goals and
create a discrepancy with several Guidelines factors. Hopefully this
Comment will call attention to serious problems, both in public
policy toward gambling and in the difficult issues raised in punishing
compulsive gamblers. Ultimately the goal is to neither punish the
pathological nor pardon the common criminal.
II. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: UNIFORMITY WITH FLEXIBILITY
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA” or “Act”) grew out
of a serious concern over “an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to
offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances.”6 The Act created a
Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing guidelines to be
followed by federal district court judges.7 The Guidelines’ goal was
to create general uniformity while allowing flexibility for
extraordinary circumstances.8 Thus, included in the SRA was a
provision allowing judges to depart from the Guidelines under
certain circumstances. “[T]he scope of the departure provision serves
as the key battleground between those urging greater uniformity and
those urging greater flexibility”9 in sentencing.

6. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38
(1983)).
7. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1986).
8. Koon, 518 U.S. at 113.
9. Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An
Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 318 (1996). The Sentencing
Guidelines have been somewhat successful in creating uniformity within each appellate circuit, but
the disparity between circuits is growing. In 2000, the Ninth Circuit departed downward in 37.9%
of all cases while the Fourth Circuit departed downward in only 5.0% of all cases (both numbers
exclude downward departures based on substantial assistance to the government). U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2000 DATAFILE, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table26.pdf (last visisted Feb.
15, 2003). Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has expressed concern that “[d]epartures are
coming to be the norm rather than the exception. . . . It looks to me like we are inching toward a
system very similar to the one in existence prior to the Guidelines, with broad sentencing discretion
vested in the district court, and relatively little appellate review.” Alex Kozinski, Carthage Must be
Destroyed, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 67, 67 (1999). It is natural for Judge Kozinski to feel this
way, given that the Ninth Circuit is his perspective point; the Ninth Circuit has by far the highest
rate of downward departure. “The goal of sentencing consistency cannot be well served when a
defendant in the Ninth Circuit is nearly ten times more likely to benefit from a downward departure
than a defendant in the Fourth Circuit.” Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures:
Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 21, 83–84 (2000).

387

STA-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/15/2003 2:59 PM

[2003

Judges were not left without guidance in deciding when a
departure might be appropriate. The Guidelines identify four
categories of factors that might affect a departure decision.10 First,
there are those few factors of which the Commission has forbidden
consideration, including race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
socioeconomic status,11 lack of guidance as a youth,12 drug or alcohol
dependence,13 and economic hardship.14
Second, certain factors are discouraged as “not ordinarily
relevant.”15 Discouraged factors include a defendant’s family ties and
responsibilities,16 education and vocational skills,17 and military, civic,
charitable, or public service record.18 Courts are also discouraged
from departing downward based upon the defendant’s “mental and
emotional conditions.”19 Discouraged factors should only be
considered in “exceptional cases.”20
Third, there are factors that the Commission encourages courts
to consider.21 For example, downward departure is encouraged for
victim provocation22 while upward departure is encouraged for
disrupting a governmental function.23 Diminished capacity is listed
among the encouraged factors, which are those the Commission
“has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the
guidelines.”24

10. As a general matter, departures are to serve the “basic purposes of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2001).
11. Id. § 5H1.10.
12. Id. § 5H1.2.
13. Id. § 5H1.4.
14. Id. § 5K2.12.
15. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
16. Id. § 5H1.6.
17. Id. § 5H1.2.
18. Id. § 5H1.11.
19. Id. § 5H1.3 (states that section 5H1.3 does not apply to factors that fall under
chapter 5 part K, which includes diminished capacity departures).
20. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
21. Id. § 5K2.0.
22. Id. § 5K2.10.
23. Id. § 5K2.7. In some instances, the relevant guideline will already have taken the
encouraged factor into account, in which case it would be inappropriate to double count the
factor unless it “is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved
in the offense.” Id. § 5K2.0.
24. Id. § 5K2.0.
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Finally, because the Sentencing Commission lacked perfect
prospicience there are countless unmentioned factors which the
sentencing court may take into account but only while considering
the “structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and
the Guidelines taken as a whole.”25 The Commission expected that
departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines would
be “highly infrequent.”26
Compulsive gambling presents a particularly complex situation
because it can implicate all four categories of departure factors.
Compulsive gambling is unmentioned in the Guidelines and
departures based on unmentioned factors were expected to be
“highly infrequent.”27 Furthermore, compulsive gambling is
considered an “emotional or mental condition[]” and thus could be
a discouraged factor.28 Often times, those who commit crimes
because they are compulsive gamblers do so because of personal
financial difficulties, a forbidden factor.29 But, if compulsive
gambling does in fact cause diminished capacity, it becomes an
encouraged factor for downward departure.30 With all four departure
factors implicated, courts are free to characterize compulsive
gambling as they wish and either grant or deny the departure.31
25. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b). The Guidelines also
allow for the possibility of an “extraordinary case that, because of a combination of . . .
characteristics or circumstances, differs significantly from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the
guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though
none of the characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes the case.” Id. § 5K2.0,
cmt. Such cases, however, should be “extremely rare.” Id. Notwithstanding the Guidelines’
admonition that departures should be “highly infrequent,” the “overall national departure rate
has been creeping steadily upward.” Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of
Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 341
(2000). While uniformity has improved within federal circuits, there is less and less uniformity
from circuit to circuit. Id. at 349.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b).
28. Id. § 5H1.3 (“Mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, except as
provided in Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 [which includes diminished capacity].”).
29. Id. § 5K2.12 (“The Commission considered the relevance of economic hardship
and determined that personal financial difficulties . . . do not warrant a decrease in sentence.”).
30. Id. § 5K2.13 (“A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if
the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental
capacity.”). However, diminished capacity departures are forbidden if the offense was caused
by voluntary use of drugs or alcohol, the defendant has a violent criminal history, or the crime
involved violence or the threat of violence. Id.
31. Several departure factors involve similar contradictions. The Supreme Court in Koon
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III. COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AND CRIME: CREATING
A NEW CLASS OF CRIMINAL
Widespread gambling is creating a new kind of criminal, as seen
in newspaper stories across the country. For example, in Wisconsin, a
fifty-seven-year-old grandmother was convicted for embezzling $1.2
million from her employer over four years to pay for her gambling.32
In Detroit, a twenty-seven-year-old elementary school teacher turned
to bank robbery after she and her boyfriend contracted huge
gambling debts at local casinos.33 The police said the teacher is one
of a growing number of criminals turning to theft because of casino
gambling debts.34 In New York City, a sixty-six-year-old
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), attempted to clarify departure jurisprudence by stating
that questions of law, such as whether a certain factor can ever be considered under the
Guidelines, should be reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, but appellate courts
otherwise should apply an abuse of discretion standard and give great deference to the
traditional role of district courts in sentencing. However, the Court then overturned the
district court on certain factual questions, thereby sending a mixed message. The failure of
Koon to clarify departure jurisprudence has spawned much literature. See, e.g., Berman, supra
note 9, at 80 (arguing that Koon has had “little substantive impact on the federal sentencing
landscape other than to exacerbate doctrinal confusion and sentencing disparities in the realm
of departures”); Deborah E. Dezelan, Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After
Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less Direction, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1679, 1716
(1997) (“This ambiguity leads not only to a district court’s uncertainty about when it can
legally depart, but also to inconsistent appellate review of departure decisions.”); Dana L.
Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities After Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 292 (1997) (“Despite its broad pronouncements about the deference due district courts,
the Court in Koon refused to defer completely to the district court’s determination” that
certain factors warranted departure.); Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing
Discretion: Koon’s Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the
Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 526 (1999) (“Koon has changed the rhetoric of departure
jurisprudence in the courts of appeals, but it has done little to change outcomes.”); id. at 516
(“The contradictory strands within the Guidelines and the disagreement between the
Commission and the Court about the degree of individualization appropriate under the
Guidelines leave ample room for the circuit courts of appeals to go their own way, as they have
since Koon was decided.”); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure
Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 19 (1996).
32. Woman Accused of $1.2 Million Theft From Employer Sentenced to Three Years in
Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 13, 2001. Some of the money was used for non-gambling
purposes, such as purchasing a Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Id.
33. David Shepardson, Casino Losers Rob Banks, DETROIT NEWS, July 15, 2002, at A1.
The teacher was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id.
34. Id. “‘We have seen an increase in the number of people who are robbing banks to
pay gambling debts at the casinos,’ said Special Agent Terry Booth in Detroit.” Id. The
newspaper story also reported on Samson Gemechu, who robbed two banks in Dearborn,
Michigan, to pay for gambling losses; Richard Kozlow, a fifty-eight-year-old man who robbed
eleven banks in ten states in a string of crimes authorities believe were gambling motivated;
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grandmother embezzled $4.9 million from her employer to finance
her gambling.35 Commenting on the case, Edward Looney of the
Council on Compulsive Gambling of New Jersey stated that whitecollar crimes “run rampant because of compulsive gambling,” and
that these criminals are generally “otherwise principled people, with
good families, who have not been in trouble with the law before.”36
A quick search reveals scores of similar stories.37
Rita Radcliffe, who robbed a bank to gamble at a casino in Connecticut; Robert Kennedy, who
robbed a bank and then fed the bills, covered with red dye from an anti-theft device, into a slot
machine in Las Vegas; and Kimberly Carter, who robbed a bank in Michigan before going to a
Detroit casino. Id. It is appropriate to note that none of these suspects would have been
eligible for a downward departure because their crimes involved violence or the threat of
violence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13.
35. Giordano, supra note 1.
36. Id. The casinos deserve some of the blame. After realizing that Checoura was a big
spender the casinos catered to her with free drinks and free meals along with free hotel rooms
and credit and other enticements, even sending limousines all the way to New York City to
pick her up for gambling trips and then taking her home for work the next day after gambling
all night. Id. Checoura’s case also demonstrates the social impact of gambling. “In court
yesterday, Norman Schoenfeld, president of S&S X-Ray, said Checoura’s theft had been ‘a
major cause’ of the company’s closing its Brooklyn office. . . . [A]bout 190 employees had lost
jobs.” Id. In fact, casinos and states receive large portions of their gambling revenues from
compulsive gamblers. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Olwen Dudgeon, Trusted Friend Jailed For Stealing Estate, YORKSHIRE
POST, June 27, 2002 (“A family friend, trusted to administer the estates of a widow and her
son after they died, stole more than £38,000 and gambled the money away, a court heard.
Much of the money was intended for charity.”); Stephen Hunt, Compulsive Gambler is Jailed
for Theft, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 30, 1997, at B3 (“Mark Madsen’s descent from respected
Salt Lake lawyer to convicted criminal dramatizes how addictions can ruin lives. Hooked on
blackjack, Madsen stole more than $250,000 to repay debts to Nevada casinos.”); Heather
Ratcliffe et al., Cashier for County Office is Accused of Stealing from Title Company, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1 (“The head cashier for the St. Louis County recorder
of deeds office was charged Wednesday with using her job to steal as much as $863,000 . . . .
Investigators found evidence that King had several large gambling debts at casinos.”); Neil
Roland, Medical Firm Sued Over Fraud Charge: SEC Targets Lauderdale Company, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, June 8, 2001, at 1D (“A Florida medical company defrauded thousands of
physicians and other investors of $52 million . . . . William J. Tishman, former principal
owner . . . used $18 million of investor funds to pay gambling debts and personal expenses, the
SEC’s lawsuit contended.”); Gambler Jailed for Swindling Sawmill, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2001,
at 8 (“A man who said he was a gambling addict was sentenced to 2 to 10 years in prison for
defrauding a sawmill out of $1.2 million by selling phony lumber contracts for forest land he
did not own or control.”); Lawyer Faces up to Nine Years, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Aug. 18, 2001,
at A3. (“A lawyer once disbarred for stealing more than $260,000 from clients faces up to nine
years in prison for cheating again. . . . [His wife] cooperated with prosecutors and told them
that Basinger used the stolen money to pay gambling debts.”); Man Charged in Holdup of Gas
Station, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 2001, at 2B (“A man allegedly robbed a Waukesha
gas station at knifepoint to help pay off a $20,000 gambling debt . . . . Police arrested Cagle
later that morning at his job at a Milwaukee restaurant.”); School Embezzler Sent to Jail,
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A. The Growing Prevalence of Compulsive Gambling
Access to gambling is growing at an alarming rate. Between
1975 and 1998, gambling industry gross revenues increased nearly
1600%, reaching $50 billion.38 This $50 billion figure accounts only
for legal gambling revenues.39 All but two states40 now have some
forms of legalized gambling.
As legalized gambling grows, so does the scourge of compulsive
gambling. For example, in Minnesota probable pathological and
problem gamblers increased from 2.5% of the adult population of the
state in 1990 to 4.4% in 1994, nearly one in every twenty adults in
the state.41 In Iowa, 1.7% of adults in the state were estimated as
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2002, at 26 (“A former school assistant business manager who was
convicted of stealing $135,000 in merchandise from the school department to pay his
gambling debts has been sent to jail for probation violations.”).
38. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 1 [hereinafter
NGISC], delivered to Congress June 18, 1999, available at http://www.npr.gov/ngisc/.
Gross revenues are measured by taking the total amount of money spent on gambling and
subtracting the amount paid out. In other words, it is the amount of money lost by gamblers.
39. Sports gambling is still illegal in every state but Nevada (and Oregon under a staterun program for betting on National Football League games), but some estimate that as much
as $25 billion to $100 billion a year is being illegally wagered. Lawrence S. Lustberg,
Sentencing the Sick: Compulsive Gambling as the Basis for a Downward Departure Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 51, 51–52 (1992) (citing Special
Report: Gambling, The Biggest Game in Town, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 10, 1986, at 30,
32.) Internet gambling is also illegal, but Christiansen Capital Advisors, an industry specialist,
estimated that Internet gambling revenue increased from $300 million in 1997 to over $1.1
billion in 1999. John M. Barron et al., The Impact of Casino Gambling on Personal Bankruptcy
Filing Rates, CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y, Oct. 1, 2002. Current estimates put industry profits at
$5 billion. Liz Benston, Officials Debate Internet Gambling, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 28, 2002,
at 3. Several major credit card companies have ceased allowing use of the cards on Internet
gambling sites in response to lawsuits of people who maxed out credit cards and then refused
to pay arguing that the credit card company should never have allowed them to use the cards
for illegal activity. See, e.g., Citibank Has Agreed to Block Online Gambling Transactions, L.A.
TIMES, June 15, 2002, at C2.
40. Hawaii and Utah still ban all forms of gambling. However, for residents of Utah,
easy access to gambling is found just across the border in cities such as Wendover, Nevada ,and
Mesquite, Nevada. Furthermore, the problem is not limited to the United States. “The
expansion of gambling is a worldwide phenomenon. The establishment of lotteries, casinos
and . . . electronic gambling devices are occurring on all continents. . . . Legal gambling issues,
such as the resulting tax revenue and unforeseen social casts, are now common issues facing
governments throughout the world.” MONTANA GAMBLING IN A NATIONAL AND GLOBAL
CONTEXT 4 (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY],
http://leg.state.mt.us/
reports/reference/past_interim/gsc98.html.
41. Id. Problem and pathological gamblers are determined by the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (“SOGS”) which assigns points based on answers to gambling-related questions and
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pathological gamblers in 1989 prior to the legalization of riverboat
casinos, but that had increased to 5.4% by 1995.42 Other states that
have conducted repeat studies have reached similar results.43
Researchers in 1997 estimated that nationwide between 2.5 to 3.2
million adults qualify as pathological gamblers at some point during
their lifetime and 1.7 to 2.6 million qualified during the previous
year.44 Among adolescents between ages twelve and eighteen, the
number of pathological gamblers was estimated at 1.1 million.45
Sadly, as budget deficits grow and the economy shrinks, gambling
becomes a tempting source of revenue for legislators not wanting to
raise taxes. As such, it is likely to expand even further.46

then labels gamblers with scores above a certain threshold as probable problem gamblers or
probable pathological gamblers. Id. at 21.
42. Joseph P. Shapiro et al., America’s Gambling Fever, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
15, 1996, at 57.
43. The number of pathological gamblers in Montana increased from 2.2% of the adult
population in 1992 to 3.6% in 1998. In Texas, the number increased from 2.5% in 1992 to
3.0% in 1995. Of the states included in the study only South Dakota showed a drop—from
1.4% in 1991 to 1.2% in 1993. Different states have conducted studies in different years with
the highs ranging from 4.9% for probable problem and pathological gamblers in Mississippi in
1996 to a low of 1.2% in South Dakota in 1993. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note
40, at 22.
44. NGISC, supra note 38, at 8.
45. Id. Research also reveals that men and women gamble at about the same rate and
wager at the same levels. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note 40, at 7 (citing J. Hrabra
& G. Lee, Gender, Gambling and Problem Gambling, 12 J. GAMBLING STUD. 83 (1996)).
46. The growth in state lotteries is the best example of this phenomenon. See Valerie C.
Lorenz, State Lotteries & Compulsive Gambling, 6 J. GAMBLING STUD. 383 (1990), cited in
Lustberg, supra note 39, at 51 n.3. Just as alcohol and marijuana are often considered gateway
drugs leading to more serious drug use, lotteries are often a gateway to more serious gambling
problems. Many pathological gamblers first discover gambling through the lottery. See
Lawrence Viele, State Lottery Has Cost Some Players Plenty, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 21, 1998,
http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/062198/met_lot2.shtml
(Government
is
“benefiting from frivolous spending by the poor, and worse, making gambling for addicts as
easy as buying a loaf of bread. . . . Some members [of Gamblers Anonymous] don’t blame the
lottery for their addiction but say the game made it easier to gamble.”). Nevertheless,
gambling is a tempting source of revenue for state governments because they are able to tax it
at higher rates than other activities without overcoming the political pressure of raising taxes
on consumers. However, gambling revenues are not the economic panacea that many believe.
Lotteries are expensive to operate and, as the NGISC reported, they are highly regressive:
Players with household incomes under $10,000 bet nearly three times as much on
lotteries as those with incomes over $50,000. . . . And, since money is fungible and
regular taxes are unpopular, research indicates that lotteries fall far short of their
promise of extra spending for desirable programs. Close studies of spending in such
areas as education and senior citizens’ programs suggest no increase due to the
existence of lotteries.
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B. Compulsive Gambling and Crime
As gambling spreads and the number of compulsive gamblers
grows, the number of crimes committed by compulsive gamblers will
logically grow. In fact, research demonstrates that there is a clear
connection between compulsive gambling and crime.47
Gambling addicts often steal to support their habit or to pay off
gambling debts. Thus, in diagnosing a compulsive gambling
disorder, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
4th edition (“DSM-IV”), known as the “standard text of the
American Psychiatric Association,” looks at whether the person “has
committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement
to finance gambling.”48 Gamblers Anonymous asks twenty questions
to determine if someone is a problem gambler, including “[h]ave
you ever committed, or considered committing, an illegal act to
finance gambling?”49

NGISC, supra note 38, at 14. Richard C. Leone, a member of the National Gambling Impact
Study Commission wrote:
Lotteries, especially, seem to bring out the worst in politicians. They are heavily and
misleadingly advertised; they pay back to bettors the smallest share of the take of any
legal game; and they are an extremely regressive form of taxation, hitting hardest
those with least ability to pay. Yet, lotteries have proven to be catnip for elected
officials who fear taxation.
Id. at 57.
Further, most gambling simply transfers money from one sector of a state’s economy to
another. The exceptions are those states, like Nevada and New Jersey, with “destination
casinos” where tourists come to gamble. This of course damages the economy of states where
such money might otherwise be spent and places pressure on them to allow destination
casinos. It is in many ways a race to the bottom.
47. See, e.g., Lustberg, supra note 39, at 54 (citing Henry R. Lesieur & Richard J.
Rosenthal, Pathological Gambling: A Review of the Literature Prepared for the American
Psychological Association Task Force on DSM-IV Committee on Disorders of Impulse Control Not
Elsewhere Classified, 7 J. OF GAMBLING STUD. 5, 24 (1991) (collecting studies regarding
criminal activity among compulsive gamblers)) (“numerous studies have revealed the link
between compulsive gambling and crime”). The Detroit News reports
[a] seven-city research project by University of Nevada-Reno . . . found that each
city had sharp increases in theft, domestic abuse and drug crimes after the opening
of casinos. The cities also had an increase in personal bankruptcies.
...
A separate study by University of Illinois economist Earl Grinols suggests that
higher crime rates begin to appear three years after casinos open, perhaps because it
takes chronic gamblers that long to exhaust their resources.
Shepardson, supra note 33, at A1.
48. DSM-IV, supra note 5, at 312.31.
49. GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/20questions.html
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Professor Henry R. Lesieur, a leading expert on the problems of
pathological gambling, has done studies revealing that pathological
gamblers commit crimes, including embezzlement and insurance
fraud, far more often than non-gamblers.50 His 1995 survey of
Gamblers Anonymous members in Illinois found that 46% admitted
to some illegal act, including writing bad checks, stealing, or
embezzling from their employer.51 A similar study in Wisconsin
revealed that 49% had stolen to finance gambling and 39% had been
arrested.52 In fact, the “American Insurance Institute has called
gambling the main cause of white-collar crime.”53
The “Gambling Impact and Behavior Study” commissioned by
Congress through the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
(“NGISC”) also showed a clear correlation between gambling
addiction and crime. The study showed that “those with more
gambling symptoms have much higher rates of lifetime arrests and
imprisonment.”54 The study revealed, “Pathological and problem
gamblers in treatment populations often reveal that they have stolen
money or other valuables in order to gamble or pay for gambling
debts.”55 A similar study commissioned by the State of Montana
concluded that “pathological gamblers are more likely to be involved
in crime and are more likely to be handled by the criminal justice
system.”56 It is possible that the same factors in a person’s life that

(last visited February 10, 2003).
50. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR. AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., GAMBLING IMPACT AND
BEHAVIOR STUDY: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 47
(April 1, 1999), http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/new/gambling.htm.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Wisbar, Resources for Wisconsin Attorneys and the Public, Gambling Addiction,
http://www.wisbar.org/bar/gambling.html (last visited February 13, 2002). In Minnesota,
for example, a growth in financial crimes has attended the explosion of gambling in the state:
“[E]mployers are losing hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to gambling-related thefts by
employees.” Dennis J. McGrath & Chris Ison, Gambling Spawns a New Breed of Criminal,
STAR TRIB., Dec 4, 1995, at 1A. Judges and prosecutors in Michigan have reported an increase
“in theft and embezzlement cases, many arising from problem gambling.” Rising Crime
Blamed on Gambling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 1, 2000. A U.S. News & World Report
analysis found that crime rates in casino cities are 84% higher than the national average, and
that while crime rates dropped nationally in 1994, in thirty-one communities that introduced
casinos crime increased by 7.7%. Shapiro, supra note 42, at 58.
54. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 50, at 47.
55. Id.
56. 1998 MONT. GAMBLING STUDY, supra note 40, at 29.
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lead to gambling may also lead to crime, but whatever factors lead
them there, compulsive gamblers commit crimes far more often than
do others.57
However, while compulsive gamblers commit crimes more
frequently than the population as a whole, this fact does not answer
the question whether the gambling addiction in fact decreases their
ability to obey the law or merely gives them a more powerful motive
to steal. That is a question that psychologists have been unable to
answer clearly, but much evidence suggests that compulsive gamblers
do not lose their ability to obey the law.58
With this backdrop, the rest of this Comment will analyze three
issues: (1) whether a proper interpretation of the Guidelines permits
compulsive gambling to be a factor for departure when the crime
committed is not a gambling-related offense, and if so, what the link
must be between the gambling addiction and the crime; (2) whether
the difficulty in diagnosing and measuring compulsive gambling
mitigates against its use as a factor for downward departure; and (3)
whether downward departures based on compulsive gambling are
consistent with the Guidelines’ treatment of other factors.
IV. THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY GUIDELINE
The diminished capacity guideline states that a sentence below
the applicable guideline range may be appropriate “if the defendant
committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced
mental capacity.”59 If the judge finds that departure is appropriate,
“the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the
reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the
offense.”60 However, departure is not allowed if: (1) the significantly
reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or
other intoxicants; (2) the crime involved violence or a serious threat
of violence; or (3) the criminal history of the offender reveals that

57. The social impacts of gambling are not limited to crime. “Such costs include
unemployment benefits, welfare benefits, physical and mental health problems, theft,
embezzlement, bankruptcy, suicide, domestic violence, and child abuse and neglect.” NGISC,
supra note 38, at 16.
58. See infra Part V.A–B.
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2001). Diminished capacity
departures are an exception to the rule that “mental and emotional conditions are not
ordinarily relevant” to determining a sentencing departure. Id. § 5H1.3.
60. Id. § 5K2.13.
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there is a need for incarceration to protect the public.61 The purpose
of this guideline is to make punishment comport with culpability—
mitigating punishment for defendants who, while not legally insane,
deserve less punishment because of some condition that society views
as making the defendant less culpable.
Before the diminished capacity guideline was amended in 1998,
some courts had held that “significantly reduced mental capacity”
included a volitional as well as a cognitive prong. In 1998, the
Sentencing Commission, recognizing this split, amended the
guideline to recognize volitional impairments.62 In the amendment,
the Commission defined significantly reduced mental capacity as a
“significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of
the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of
reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is
wrongful.”63 Definition (A) covers cognitive impairments and gives a
defendant the excuse that he did not understand that the criminal act
he was committing was wrong. Definition (B) covers volitional
impairments and allows the defendant to argue that while he knew
the behavior was wrong, he was unable to control his actions. This
Comment is concerned only with Definition (B).64 Section A below
61. Id.
62. The Sentencing Commission adopted the definition of significantly reduced mental
capacity that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals promulgated in United States v. McBroom, 124
F.3d. 533 (3d Cir. 1997). Originally, in United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir.
1991), the court rejected a downward departure based on a gambling addiction, noting that the
defendant “was able to absorb information in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason,”
thereby rejecting the notion that the diminished capacity guideline included volitional impairments.
In McBroom, however, the Third Circuit overturned similar reasoning by the district court and found
that the phrase “reduced mental capacity” included an inability to conform one’s actions to the
requirements of the law. 124 F.3d at 546. This debate is not a new one. M’Naghten’s Rule was
criticized because it did not allow for a volitional element but was limited to cognitive impairments.
See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 970 (6th ed. 1998). The Model Penal Code
included a volitional prong to supplement M’Naghten’s Rule: “A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.” Id. at 544. However, in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,
Congress “deleted the ‘volitional prong’ of the insanity defense.” Id. at 545 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17
(1984)).
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001).
64. The amendment became effective on November 1, 1998. The original guideline
read:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly
reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants,
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will discuss the interpretations that have been given to the
diminished capacity guideline, including some of the concerns with
each interpretation. Section B will briefly argue that the compromise
interpretation is most in conformity with the purpose of the
volitional impairment guideline.
A. Interpreting the Diminished Capacity Guideline
Three different approaches have been taken toward the
diminished capacity guideline for volitional impairments. First, some
assert that the language of the guideline requires that for a volitional
impairment to be an appropriate factor for departure, the defendant
must have an inability to control the behavior constituting the
offense.65 In other words, for compulsive gambling to be a factor for
departure, the underlying crime would have to be a gambling
offense, not collateral behavior that enables the gambling.
Compulsive gambling, this argument proposes, creates an
uncontrollable urge to gamble, not to steal. A second interpretation
requires merely that the gambling addiction provide a motive for the
offense.66 As long as the crime is explained by the compulsive
gambling, a sort of but-for test, the defendant can be granted a
downward departure. The third interpretation focuses on whether
the volitional impairment actually impaired the defendant’s ability to
resist the crime in question rather than merely provided a motive for
the crime, though the crime does not necessarily have to be directly
related to gambling or be a gambling offense.67 In other words,
merely establishing that a person embezzled money because he was a
compulsive gambler is not enough. Expert testimony would have to

a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant’s
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.
Id. § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Carucci, 33 F. Supp. 2d 302, 302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(rejecting request for downward departure based on gambling addiction and stating that “a
compulsive gambler is not, a fortiori, a compulsive illegal trader”).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) (granting a
departure based on compulsive gambling and holding that the guideline does not distinguish
between diminished capacity “that explain[s] the behavior that constituted the crime . . . [or]
that explain[s] the behavior that motivated the crime”).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Roach, 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying downward
departure based on addiction to shopping where defendant did not show diminished ability to
obey the law).
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establish that the compulsive gambling significantly impaired the
defendant’s ability to act within the law. There is no clear majority
approach.
1. Interpreting the guideline to require a direct link
The most rigid reading of the diminished capacity guideline
would disallow a court from departing downward based on a
gambling addiction when the underlying crime was not a gambling
offense. This approach seems to have been the controlling
construction in United States v. Carucci,68 where the defendant, a
floor broker at the New York Stock Exchange, had engaged in illegal
trading to support his compulsive gambling disorder.69 The court
rejected his request for downward departure stating that if his crime
were unlawful gambling he would have a colorable argument, but “a
compulsive gambler is not, a fortiori, a compulsive illegal trader.”70
This interpretation is arguably required by the Guidelines’
definition of significantly reduced mental capacity. The definition
reads
“Significantly reduced mental capacity” means the defendant,
although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A)

68. 33 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 302–03. Some cases decided before the 1998 amendment required a direct
link. In Venezia v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1995), another compulsive
gambling case, the court held that there must be a direct connection between the reduced
mental capacity and the crime committed: “It is true that [the defendant’s] gambling losses
resulted in large debts, and that his indebtedness provided additional motivation to continue
and expand his fraudulent operations,” but “a more compelling motive to defraud is not the
kind of direct causation between mental capacity and commission of the offense envisioned by
§ 5K2.13.” Id. at 926. Similarly, in United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1998),
the court noted that collateral behavior which enables compulsive behavior is not sufficiently
linked to the volitional impairment to merit a departure. In Miller, the court overturned a
downward departure based on the defendant’s compulsive attraction to adult pornography
where the defendant had traded in child pornography in order to gather more adult
pornography. The court found that
at most, the defendant’s impulse disorder was related to his viewing of adult
pornography and acting out sexually with adults, and that his offense conduct was
no more related to the impulse disorder than if he had robbed someone in order to
use the proceeds to purchase adult pornography. The impulse was related to viewing
pornography, but was not related to the means of obtaining the pornography.
Id. at 1286. Expert testimony in the case had established only his compulsion to view adult
pornography but “failed to establish that the disorder caused him to trade child pornography,
which is the offense for which he was being sentenced.” Id.
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understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense
or to exercise the power of reason [(cognitive)]; or (B) control
behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful [(volitional)].71

Cognitive impairment departures are explicitly limited to cases in
which the defendant’s impairment prevents him from understanding
the wrongfulness of the behavior “comprising the offense.”72 The
volitional impairment clause uses the same words, “wrongful” and
“behavior.”73 There is no indication that the Sentencing
Commission intended wrongful behavior to be limited to the
behavior constituting the offense for cognitive impairments but did
not intend the same for volitional impairments. After all, the
definition comprises a single sentence. It is an axiom of judicial
interpretation that the same or similar language used in close
proximity is construed to mean the same thing.74
However, the opposite could also be the correct construction.
The fact that the Commission used such explicit language respecting
cognitive impairments but did not repeat the restriction in the
subsequent clause defining volitional impairments could indicate that
the Commission did not desire to inhibit volitional impairments in
the same manner as cognitive impairments. Limiting cognitive
impairments in this manner but not volitional impairments makes
sense considering the nature of the impairments. If the defendant
understands the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the
offense, mitigation based on a cognitive impairment would be
inappropriate because the defendant was not cognitively impaired.
However, it is possible that a defendant with a volitional impairment,
such as compulsive gambling, may have an impaired ability to
control behavior collateral to gambling which nonetheless enables
his gambling.

71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001) (emphasis
added).
72. Id.
73. Id. at n.1(B).
74. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (When a word is used twice
in the same phrase it is “reasonable to give each use a similar construction.”).
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2. Behavior that motivates the crime
The strict interpretation above was rejected in United States v.
Sadolsky.75 Sadolsky was a regional manager for Sears Roebuck who,
over a period of six months, credited returned merchandise to his
own credit card (collateral behavior) in order to pay gambling debts
in the amount of $30,000.76 At sentencing, Sadolsky’s request for a
downward departure under section 5K2.13 due to his gambling
addiction was granted.77 On appeal, the government argued that the
departure was improper because the underlying crime was not a
gambling offense.78 The Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s
argument stating, “[s]ection 5K2.13 does not distinguish between
[volitional impairments] that explain the behavior that constituted
the crime charged and [volitional impairments] that explain the
behavior that motivated the crime. . . . 5K2.13 does not require a
direct causal link between the [volitional impairment] and the crime
charged.”79 The court offered little justification for this cursory
statement. More troubling, the court never addressed whether
Sadolsky’s gambling problem in fact impaired his ability to obey the
law, a different question from whether the gambling problem

75. 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000).
76. Id. at 940.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 942–43.
79. Id. at 943. Other than this cursory statement, the court never addressed the
government’s proposed interpretation of the Guidelines or why the Commission would limit
cognitive impairments to behavior “comprising the offense” but not do the same with respect
to volitional impairments. Nor did the court determine what “behavior that the defendant
knows is wrongful,” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (2001),
would be if it is not the behavior constituting the offense. The court in Sadolsky cites United
States v. Harris, 1994 WL 683429 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), a case decided before the amendment was
added to the Guidelines defining significantly reduced mental capacity. In Harris, the judge
specifically refused to address the question of causation because he found that the defendant
failed to prove he had a pathological gambling disorder. Sadolsky also cited McBroom for the
proposition that section 5K2.13 does not distinguish between behavior that constitutes the
crime and behavior that motivates the crime. However, in McBroom, the volitional impairment
(an addiction to all manner of pornography) was directly related to the crime (possession of
child pornography). United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally, the
court in Sadolsky also cites United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993), for
the proposition that a significantly reduced mental capacity need only be a contributing cause
and not the sole or but-for cause of the crime. However, this begs the question whether the
volitional impairment was directly related to the offense and lends nothing to an interpretation
of the diminished capacity guideline. Cantu was also decided five years before the guideline
was amended.
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motivated the crime.80 Nevertheless, Sadolsky has been followed by
other courts.81
The Sixth Circuit also believed the strict interpretation could
lead to arbitrary results. For example, the Sixth Circuit noted that
under the government’s proposed interpretation “if someone with an
eating disorder stole food, he or she would be entitled to a
downward departure. . . . If, however, that same person stole money
to buy food, he or she would not be entitled to a downward
departure.”82 This analogy at least partially misses the point of the
strict interpretation. The proffered interpretation would in fact
prohibit departures where the defendant either stole food or stole
money to buy food. An inability to resist the desire to eat does not
automatically lead to an inability to resist the desire to steal food or
to steal money to buy food.83 Many people with compulsions would
nonetheless refuse to steal even if necessary to support their habit. It
may be that those who do steal under such circumstances simply
have fewer compunctions about doing so, not that their compulsion
to eat is any greater than those who refuse to steal. The difference
could be one of morality, not compulsion.84

80. One of the inherent difficulties with volitional impairments is the lack of clear
standards for determining when they exist. Sadolsky’s behavior occurred over several months
and involved detailed planning, yet the court accepted the proposition that, because of a
compulsive gambling disorder, Sadolsky could not help himself. Further, Sadolsky did not steal
the money to gamble but rather stole it to pay off his gambling debts. The court never
addressed how its decision could be squared with the Guidelines’ prohibition of departures
based on economic hardship. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Checoura, 176 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.J. 2001) (upholding
downward departure where pathological gambling motivated transportation of stolen
property); United States v. Ming, 2001 WL 1631874 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding downward
departure for compulsive gambling that motivates crime appropriate but finding insufficient
connection under facts presented).
82. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d at 943.
83. The court in United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985), said:
[I]t does not seem to us enough to show that gambling is compulsive, . . . money is
necessary for gambling and therefore the stealing of money is equally “compulsive.”
The stealing may follow as a matter of logic or means-end reasoning but this in itself
should not necessarily result in a psychiatric characterization of the act of stealing as
“compulsive.”
84. In fact, as the statistics cited in Part III above demonstrate, a large number of
compulsive gamblers have resisted the compulsion to steal to continue their gambling habit,
many by choosing to get professional help instead. A classic criminal law case perhaps illustrates
this point. Four men are stranded on a boat with nothing to eat; they are starving and near
death. There is little doubt that if food were placed before them they could hardly resist its
temptation. Three of the men decide to cast lots to see which of the men will be killed for the
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This is not the first time these issues have been raised. Numerous
defendants attempted to use compulsive gambling as an insanity
defense in cases where the underlying offense was not gambling
related but was motivated by a gambling disorder. The volitional
insanity cases unanimously rejected testimony of compulsive
gambling under the volitional prong of the insanity defense where
the underlying crime was not a gambling offense. These cases
generally state, for example, that “there does not exist the requisite
nexus between compulsive gambling and non-gambling offenses
generally. . . for a compulsive gambling disorder to serve as the basis
of an insanity defense to such offenses.”85
However, the purpose of the diminished capacity guideline is to
mitigate punishment, not eliminate it. Thus, the guideline provides
that the reduction in sentence should reflect the degree to which the
volitional impairment contributed to the commission of the
offense.86 That the volitional impairment motivated the offense
should not be enough, nor should it matter if the behavior was
collateral to the volitional impairment. The critical issue is whether
the volitional impairment in fact diminished the defendant’s ability
to control his behavior, whether collateral or not. This is not to say
that whether or not the offense behavior was a gambling-related
offense is irrelevant. As the volitional insanity compulsive gambling
cases demonstrate, “a compulsion to gamble, even if a mental disease
or defect, is not, ipso facto, relevant to the issue whether the
other to eat so that the others may survive. The fourth man, whose compulsion to eat is just as
great as the others; refuses to participate because of moral qualms the others do not share to
the same degree. The difference between the men is not one of compulsion, but of morality.
See Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
85. United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States
v. Davis, 772 F. 2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing to allow evidence of compulsive
gambling where defendant had failed to show acceptance among scientific community that
“compulsive gambling involves in some persons the inability to conform their conduct to the
laws prohibiting check forgery” and noting that the district court would have allowed the
evidence if the offense charged was a gambling offense); United States v. Gould, 741 F. 2d 45,
48 (4th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with Lewellyn and Torniero in rejecting compulsive gambling “as
the basis for an insanity defense to criminal offenses collateral to gambling”); United States v.
Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 732 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[A] compulsion to gamble, even if a mental
disease or defect, is not, ipso facto, relevant to the issue whether the defendant was unable to
restrain himself from non-gambling offenses such as transporting stolen property.”); United
States v. Lewellyn, 723 F. 2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting testimony of compulsive
gambling where defendant failed to show general acceptance of the theory that “pathological
gamblers lack substantial capacity to refrain from committing embezzlement”).
86. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13.
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defendant was unable to restrain himself from non-gambling
offenses.”87 Thus, courts should be wary of requests for downward
departure when the offense behavior is not directly related to the
pathological problem.
3. The Roach approach
An intermediate approach was fashioned in United States v.
Roach88 when the court agreed with Sadolsky that the diminished
capacity guideline does not distinguish between direct and indirect
causes but also noted that “understanding the defendant’s motive
does not necessarily reveal anything about the defendant’s mental
capacity at the time of the offense.”89 This approach is a much more
fact-specific inquiry, as the analysis in Roach demonstrates.
Roach suffered from chronic depression and compulsively
shopped to relieve her depression. She embezzled more than
$240,000 from her employer by submitting false expense reports,
not because she needed the money to shop, but to hide the
shopping expenses from her husband.90 In fact, she had shopped
compulsively for years without committing theft of any kind. The
embezzlement began when Roach submitted an expense report for
conference registration fees that she had placed on her personal
credit card.91 When she was unable to attend the conference, the fees
were refunded but not until after her employer had already
reimbursed her.92 Roach continued to submit false expense reports
until she was caught. After Roach pled guilty, the trial court, citing
Sadolsky, granted her a downward departure based on her compulsive
shopping disorder.93

87. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 732.
88. 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002). Roach is a compulsive shopping case, not a
compulsive gambling case; however, the use of Roach here is meant to demonstrate a proper
interpretation of the diminished capacity volitional impairment guideline. Since compulsive
shopping is a volitional impairment, the use of Roach here seems appropriate.
89. Id. at 570. “We agree with the government that § 5K2.13 requires more than a
connection between the impairment and the motive.” Id. at 569.
90. Id. at 566–67. In fact, she and her husband combined earned more than $300,000
a year.
91. Id at 567.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 567–68.
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At the sentencing hearing, several psychiatrists testified as to
Roach’s compulsive shopping, but none clearly established her
inability to control her fraudulent “conduct at the time of her
offense.”94 The first psychiatrist testified that compulsive shoppers
often “commit illegal acts . . . to finance their illness.”95 The Seventh
Circuit, in overturning the departure, rejected the testimony, noting
that “missing from [the psychiatrist’s] statement is any conclusion
that this aspect of the disorder even applies to Roach or, if it did, any
assessment of the role it played at the time of her offense.”96
The second psychiatrist testified that during her criminal activity
Roach was “functioning in a dissociated state in which information
about the legal, practical and moral consequences of her actions was
not effectively available to her.”97 The appellate court also rejected
this testimony because of “Roach’s own statements that she began
the fraud after inadvertently discovering that she could”98 and not
because of an overwhelming compulsion. Because of the “episodic
nature of her impairment, and the fact that Roach had ‘selfmedicated’ her depression and compulsively shopped for more than
ten years without any criminal activity,”99 the court found a lack of
evidence supporting a diminished capacity to control fraudulent
behavior.100
The third psychiatrist was similarly unhelpful. His “only
observation about Roach’s offense conduct—that she defrauded her
employer in an attempt to hide her behaviors—tends to undermine,
rather than support, a finding that Roach had a significantly impaired
capacity to control her conduct at the time of the offense.”101 In the
end, the appellate court overturned the departure because the
findings on Roach’s motives did not “establish the critical issue of
her mental capacity at the time of the offense.”102 The court found
that “the analytic leap from a shopping compulsion to a significantly
impaired ability to control fraudulent conduct spanning three years is

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 571–73.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id.
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too great to make”103 where the defendant had clearly demonstrated
the capacity for self-control.
Roach had suffered from compulsive shopping most of her adult
life. She did not become a thief until the opportunity serendipitously
presented itself and then she did so only to hide the activity from her
husband—not because she could not help herself.104 Thus, while
Roach almost certainly would not have stolen the money “but-for”
her shopping compulsion, such a motive alone was not enough to
overcome the fact that she had managed to avoid such criminal
activity for years before turning to crime. The court focused on the
critical question of the diminished capacity guideline, whether
Roach’s ability to obey the law was significantly diminished because
of her volitional impairment.
B. Following the Roach Approach
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Roach is the most
consistent with the Guidelines. First, it focuses on the primary
question of diminished capacity—whether the defendant in fact had
a significantly impaired ability to resist his unlawful behavior.
Second, it does not rely on the type of crime involved, as would the
strict approach discussed above, but it does exercise caution towards
a request for downward departure based on behavior collateral to the
compulsion.
The Roach approach is also most in line with the policy of the
diminished capacity guideline to ease the punishment of those who
lack substantial capacity to control their behavior and mete out
punishment to reflect the level of culpability, regardless of the
underlying crime. The Sadolsky approach, on the other hand, is
dangerous both to the goal of uniformity and to the policy of the
Guidelines. Compulsive behavior motivates any number of crimes,
and every sentencing judge “could have his or her own view of an
unlimited array of pathologies as being the cause of the particular
criminal behavior.”105 Furthermore, establishing motive does not

103. Id. at 572–73.
104. The Seventh Circuit even hinted that such a holding otherwise might conflict with
the Guidelines’ prohibition of departures based on personal financial difficulties and economic
pressure but withheld judgment on that issue because it was not before the court. Id. at 571
n.4 (citing United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000)).
105. United States v. Jones, No. 01 CR 457, 2002 WL 449014, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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clarify the critical question of culpability, whether the impulse was
irresistible or just not resisted. 106
Roach also raises several questions that are appropriate in the
compulsive gambling context. For example, the court may want to
know whether the defendant had expended all of his own resources
and had only turned to theft as a last resort and the only means of
satisfying the compulsion to gamble. The court would also want to
know the circumstances that led to the theft. Was it indeed the
desperate act of a compulsive gambler or simply an opportunity that
unexpectedly presented itself? Had the defendant demonstrated the
capacity for self-control? Was the motive in committing the theft in
fact to satisfy a compulsive need to gamble, or was it to hide the
gambling from a spouse, or even to pay off a gambling debt? The
court may also want to know whether the defendant had ever stolen
before he began to gamble, suggesting he may simply be a thief who
happens to have a gambling problem. Finally, the court would want
to know how long the defendant gambled before committing the
theft. The fact that the gambling had continued for some time
without the defendant turning to crime may suggest that the
defendant did in fact have the capacity to control his criminal
behavior.107 Most importantly, the court must determine whether
compulsive gambling causes diminished capacity. As the next section
makes clear, that is not an easy question.
V. COMPULSIVE GAMBLING AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY
The above section discussed the proper interpretation of the
diminished capacity guideline for volitional impairments. However,
“[a] court only gets to [the guideline] when it has determined that

106. For example, imagine a compulsive gambler sitting at a slot machine who sees a
$100 bill hanging out of the pocket of the man sitting next to him. The compulsive gambler
still has plenty of money of his own, and has never stolen before, but realizes that if he takes
this money he can hide his gambling from his wife, so he takes it. The theft is clearly motivated
by his gambling addiction, but was it uncontrollable? He would have been able to satisfy his
need to gamble without the money. Or imagine that he took the money, not to gamble, but to
buy groceries on the way home because he had gambled away the grocery money. Does the
theft still satisfy a compulsive need to gamble?
107. However, it may also be true that while the defendant resisted the compulsion to
steal to support his habit for quite some time, at some point the compulsion may have
worsened to the point that resisting became more difficult. Thus, the fact that he was able to
resist for a time does not fully answer the question of whether, at the time of the offense, the
defendant was still fully capable of resisting.
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the defendant suffers from a diminished capacity.”108 A gambling
addiction gives a defendant a powerful motive for the crime, but
there is little evidence it creates a lack of willpower greater than that
exhibited by most criminals. Section A below makes a comparison
with the volitional insanity defense and notes that compulsive
gambling was generally rejected as a volitional impairment for
insanity purposes because of a lack of evidence that it weakened the
will of the individual. Section B will discuss some of the psychiatric
evidence associated with compulsive gambling.
A. Compulsive Gambling Under the Volitional Insanity Defense
Following the acquittal of John Hinckley in 1982 for the
attempted murder of President Reagan, a movement began to
modify the insanity defense.109 The American Psychiatric Association
had called for removal of the “volitional prong” from the insanity
defense.110 The American Bar Association also supported ridding the
criminal law of volitional impairment insanity.111 In 1984, Congress
passed legislation eliminating the volitional prong from the federal
insanity defense.112 The primary reason for this was the impossibility
of distinguishing between those “unable to conform to the law from
those unwilling to do so.”113

108. United States v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 895 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 62, at 1010; see also Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the
Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985).
110. United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 727 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, at 12
(1982), reprinted in 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983)).
111. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 727 n.4 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON
THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983)).
112. The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984) states:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense.
The IDRA not only rejected volitional impairments but also placed the burden of proving
insanity on the defendant. Id. An Oregon statute placing the burden on the defendant was
challenged on due process grounds but was upheld by the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952). Leland also found that the “irresistible impulse” test is not “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty and thus not found in the due process clause.” Id. at 801.
113. Pelayo, supra note 4, at 735 n.29 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 228 (1983)).
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Perhaps the greatest difficulty with volitional impairments is
there is no established means of measuring them. The Fifth Circuit,
in rejecting volitional insanity, noted that “a majority of psychiatrists
now believe that they do not possess sufficient accurate scientific
bases for measuring a person’s capacity for self-control or for
calibrating the impairment of that capacity.”114 The American
Psychiatric Association agreed: “The line between an irresistible
impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than
between twilight and dusk.”115
Criminals as a class have generally exhibited a lack of will power.
This was noted in United States v. Jones,116 where the court rejected a
motion for downward departure in an embezzlement case involving
a bank teller who was a compulsive gambler and needed the money
to support her habit.117 The court found little difference between her
and other criminals. “Need, real or perceived, is at the root of many
types of crimes, especially embezzlements.”118 When presented with
the opportunity to steal
there will almost always be a need, “compulsive” or “pathological,”
to steal so long as the teller has an attitude that tolerates theft or
other criminal or antisocial behavior. If a defendant could qualify
for a downward departure by showing that a compulsive disorder
provided his motive, then virtually all embezzlements could be
excused to some degree, as caused by a need for money to gamble,
carry on an affair, or to live a more lavish lifestyle.119

Compulsive gambling consistently failed as an insanity claim.120
In fact, care was taken in defining compulsive gambling to ensure
that it would not qualify as volitional insanity. Thus, the DSM-III,
the first psychiatric manual to include compulsive gambling as an

114. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Pelayo, supra
note 4, at 735 n.29 (“It seems clear from the legislative history that Congress’s main concern
in passing the IDRA was that the volitional insanity defense cannot be reliably administered at
trial, because of inherent problems with distinguishing those unable to conform to the law
from those unwilling to do so.”).
115. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 248 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 110, at 11).
116. 2002 WL 449014 (2002).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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impulse control disorder, purposely defined the disorder as a “failure
to resist rather than an inability to resist.”121 This made it unlikely
that compulsive gambling would qualify as insanity under the
volitional prong of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) insanity test,
the accepted test in most federal circuits at the time.122 In fact,
numerous cases rejected compulsive gambling under the ALI
volitional insanity test, noting the lack of acceptance among the
scientific community that compulsive gamblers lack the capacity to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.123 The simple
conclusion to be drawn was that compulsive gambling, while perhaps
making it more difficult to resist criminal behavior, was in no way
thought to excuse it or cause it.124

121. See United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984).
122. Id. The ALI approach was adopted into the Model Penal Code and allowed
volitional impairments as an insanity defense when the defendant “lacks substantial capacity . . .
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MOENSSENS ET. AL., supra note 62,
at 1002. This approach supplemented M’Naghten’s Rule—a cognitive test only. The ALI
approach was adopted by nearly all of the federal circuits, though sometimes with minor
modifications. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.
1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Leister, 393
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States,
325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963). The First Circuit also suggested use of the test in remanding a
case in Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962). These cases were all overturned
by the Insanity Defense Reform Act. See supra note 108. However, some circuits had already
abandoned a volitional insanity test. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.
1984).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
testimony of compulsive gambling under the Frye test as irrelevant when the underlying crime
was not gambling); United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant
failed to show “necessary support among the relevant professional and medical community for
the proposition that compulsive gambling involves in some persons the inability to conform
their conduct” to the law); United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1984)
(defendant failed to meet a test of “foundational relevance” by showing “substantial
acceptance” that “pathological gambling may deprive some persons of the capacity to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the law” at least where a non-gambling offense is
involved); United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731–32 (2d Cir. 1984) (no showing of
substantial acceptance among respected authorities in the mental health profession that a
compulsive gambler is unable to resist the impulse to steal); United States v. Lewellyn, 723
F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant failed to make “required minimum showing . . .
that some pathological gamblers lack substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the
requirements of laws . . . .”).
124. The American Psychiatric Association wrote that “‘persons with antisocial
personality disorders [such as compulsive gambling] should, at least for heuristic reasons, be
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While the insanity cases were in the context of determining
ultimate guilt rather than degree of punishment, the question is the
same—whether compulsive gambling in some way overpowers the
will of the individual.125 A gambling addiction may give a defendant
a powerful motive for a crime but there is little evidence that it
causes a loss of control beyond that exhibited by most people in
prison. The Supreme Court noted,
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-social criminal,
and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse
in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate
standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they
have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that
reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of
others.126

B. Does Compulsive Gambling Cause Diminished Capacity?
There is serious debate about the effects of compulsive gambling
on the individual. For treatment and clinical purposes, the DSM-IV
terms “pathological gambling” as an Impulse Control Disorder.127
held accountable for their behavior.’” Torniero, 735 F.2d at 733 (quoting AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 110, at 11).
125. It is not necessarily inconsistent for compulsive gambling to mitigate punishment
while not completely excusing the crime:
That compulsive gambling may lessen a convicted defendant’s punishment, though
it may not constitute a defense precluding his or her conviction, engenders no
inconsistency whatsoever. The liability phase of a criminal trial determines whether
the defendant has committed an offense and, if so, whether there is a justification or
excuse that warrants withholding blame for his or her actions. The purpose of
sentencing, on the other hand, is to impose a just punishment, in light of the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
It is thus not surprising that, while a jurisdiction may reject a particular defense, it
will allow the very same facts to provide a basis for the mitigation of sentence.
Lustberg, supra note 39, at 73. This view is supported by the language of the guideline stating
that the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the diminished capacity
contributed to the crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13. It is also
supported by the policy that punishment should comport with culpability. However, this does
not resolve the difficulties in measuring volitional impairments, nor the fact, as discussed
below, that gambling addiction may not in fact cause a lack of control when it comes to
criminal behavior.
126. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
127. DSM-IV, supra note 5, at 312.31. Other impulse control disorders include
kleptomania, pyromania, and trichotillomania (pulling out one’s hair). Id. The DSM-IV offers
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Under the DSM-IV criteria, pathological gambling is diagnosed in a
person who exhibits any five or more of the following factors:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling . . . [;]
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to
achieve the desired excitement[;]
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop
gambling[;]
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop
gambling[;]
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a
dysphoric mood . . . [;]
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get
even . . . [;]
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the
extent of involvement with gambling[;]
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or
embezzlement to finance gambling[;]
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or
educational or career opportunity because of gambling[; or]
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate
financial situation caused by gambling[.]128

a word of caution as to its use in the legal field:
[I]nclusion here, for clinical and research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as
Pathological Gambling does not imply that the condition meets legal or other
nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental disease, mental disorder or mental
disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in the categorization of
these conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments,
for example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability
determination and competency.
Id. at xxxvii.
128. Id at 312.31. Numbers (2), (4), (5), and (9) suggest that gambling addiction is
similar to drug and alcohol addiction, forbidden factors under the guidelines. See infra Part
V.C.
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Only number three indicates an impaired ability to control
behavior that one knows is wrongful, and even it speaks only of
“unsuccessful efforts,” not inability or even impaired ability. In fact,
even though classified as an impulse control disorder, there is little
evidence that loss of control is a distinctive feature of pathological
gambling.129 Many authors believe that “pathological gamblers do
not really experience irresistible impulses and that they retain control
over their behaviour.”130 Some studies suggest that personality and
social attachment are more the cause of crime among gamblers than
a gambling addiction.131 This makes compulsive gamblers who steal
little different from other criminals who also generally exhibit a lack
of willpower and not a lack of control.
In sum, there are inherent dangers of misdiagnosis with
volitional impairments, and there is serious disagreement as to
whether compulsive gambling actually results in a loss of self-control.
Because of this, courts should be wary of claims that compulsive
gambling seriously impaired the gambler defendant’s ability to obey
the law. Compulsive gamblers are worthy of sympathy, especially in
light of the fact that the state often compounds their problem by
promoting gambling. However, unless they can demonstrate more
than a failure of will, they should not be granted a downward
departure. Certain punishment may provide a counterbalancing
effect to the otherwise powerful pull of pathological behavior.
VI. INCOMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER GUIDELINE FACTORS
This Comment argues that downward departures based on
compulsive gambling should not be granted. This argument is
partially based on the difficulty of diagnosing and measuring
compulsive gambling disorders. There is at least one more reason to
make such departures rare. Downward departures based on
compulsive gambling are inconsistent with several other provisions of

129. See, e.g., Mark W. Langewisch & G. Ron Frisch, Classification of Pathological
Gambling as an Impulse Control Disorder, ELEC. J. GAMBLING ISSUES, Nov. 14, 2000,
http://www.camh.net/egambling (citing J.B. Murray, Review of Research on Pathological
Gambling, 72 PSYCH. REP. 791 (1993)).
130. Id.
131. Dr. Gerhard Meyer, Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior, 10th
International Conference on Gambling and Risk-Taking, Bremen Germany (June 4, 1997) in
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 517 (W.R. Eadington & J.A. Cornelius, eds.
1998).
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the Guidelines. Several of the other guidelines bear on departures
based on compulsive gambling. Downward departures for
diminished capacity are the exceptions to the rule that “[m]ental and
emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant”132 in determining
sentencing departures. Allowing downward departures based on
gambling addiction would also create severe conflict with the
Guidelines’ treatment of drug and alcohol addiction. Finally, several
of the gambling addicts who have received downward departures
stole to pay off gambling debts, a seeming conflict with the
Guidelines’ prohibition of departures based on economic need.133
A. Similarity to Drug and Alcohol Addiction
Pathological gambling is an inappropriate factor for
consideration because of its similarity to drug and alcohol
addiction—forbidden factors under the Guidelines.134 One
commentator has noted that the Guidelines’ requirement “that the
defendant’s ‘reduced mental capacity’ not be caused by the
‘voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants’ [suggests] . . . that the
drafters specifically sought to limit application of the [diminished
capacity] provision to those who could not be deemed ‘responsible’
for their mental state.”135 If this is true then it applies equally to
gambling addiction.
“Pathological gambling, clinically speaking, is generally
considered analogous to alcoholism and substance abuse as they are
often present in the same people, as well as in the same families.”136
Pathological gambling is often treated successfully in treatment
programs with substance abusers.137 Clearly, gambling is different
than substance abuse; however,

132. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2001).
133. Id. § 5K2.12; see, e.g., United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2000).
134. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2001); see Langewisch &
Frisch, supra note 129 (citing S.B. Blume, Compulsive Gambling and the Medical Model, 3 J.
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 237 (1987)).
135. Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 441 (1995).
136. Langewisch & Frisch, supra note 129 (citing Blume, supra note 134, at 237);
Lesieur & Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 5; see also Stanton Peele, Is Gambling an Addiction Like
Drug and Alcohol Addiction? Developing Realistic and Useful Conceptions of Compulsive
Gambling (February 2001), at http://www.camh.net/egambling/.
137. Langewisch & Frisch, supra note 129.
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what gamblers often describe as the sensation they experience while
gambling is similar to the sensation substance abusers describe
when using drugs or alcohol. Gambling, similar to drug and
alcohol abuse, are [sic] all characterized by increases in tolerance,
cravings and a consistent need to continue to take the drug or
indulge in the behavior.138

At least one circuit court, while refusing to review the district
court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward, agreed with
the district court that the “general purpose of deterrence would be ill
served by discounting appellant’s sentence” on the basis of a
gambling addiction because “such a dependence would be akin to
drug or alcohol addiction.”139
To distinguish between drug and alcohol addiction and
gambling addiction does not serve a primary goal of the Sentencing
Guidelines—uniformity.140 Drug and alcohol dependence are
forbidden factors at least partly because “[s]ubstance abuse is highly
correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime.”141 Further,
drug and alcohol use cannot be used to argue diminished capacity
because it is “voluntary.”142 Both reasons apply equally, if not more
forcefully, to gambling addiction. In United States v. Katzenstein,143
the court refused to grant a downward departure based on a
gambling addiction and rejected the defendant’s contention that
gambling addiction should be distinguished from drug and alcohol
addiction. The court stated:
The Sentencing Guidelines’ rationale for distinguishing between
significantly reduced mental capacity (1) resulting from voluntary
use of drugs or other intoxicants, and (2) resulting from other
causes, is opaque. The only two clues to the rationale found in the
Sentencing Guidelines are, first, the reference to the use of
intoxicants as ‘voluntary,’ and, second, the statement that
substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to
commit crime.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1047 (1st Cir. 1990).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2001).
Id. § 5H1.4.
Id. § 5K2.13.
No. 90 CR 272 (KNW), 1991 WL 24386 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Defendant[] . . . has not convinced the court that compulsive
gambling disorder can be distinguished in any [principled] way
from abuse of drugs or alcohol.144

The decision to gamble is as voluntary as the decision to use
alcohol or drugs and both lead to an increased propensity to commit
crime.145 As such, the reasons the Sentencing Commission has given
for forbidding diminished capacity departures based on the voluntary
use of intoxicants and for forbidding all departures based on drug
and alcohol addiction apply just as forcefully to compulsive
gambling. Unlike drug and alcohol use, there is no mental
impairment associated with gambling addiction and, as discussed
above, it is not clear that gambling addiction causes a loss of selfcontrol with respect to the resultant crime.146 Stealing to support a
gambling habit is hardly distinguishable from stealing to support a
drug or alcohol habit. To reward the gambling addict, who may in
fact suffer from neither volitional nor cognitive impairment, while
ignoring the chemical addict who often suffers from both, creates its
own unwarranted disparity by making gambling addiction an
encouraged factor for departure while leaving drug and alcohol
addiction as forbidden factors.
B. Contradiction with Other Guidelines Factors
Departures based on gambling addiction conflict with at least two
other provisions of the Guidelines. Downward departures based on
mental and emotional conditions147 are discouraged while departures
based on economic hardship148 are forbidden. Often times, compulsive

144. Id. at *2. But see Lustberg, supra note 39, at 68:
[T]he fact that the Commission specifically barred the “voluntary use of drugs or
other intoxicants” from contributing to the “significantly reduced mental
capacity” . . . but did not treat gambling in the same manner, indicates its intention
that gambling may be treated differently. That the Commission has not modified
the Guidelines to explicitly account for compulsive gambling, as it has in light of
other court decisions bearing upon the appropriateness of departure, is also
indicative of the Commission’s acceptance of compulsive gambling as a potential
basis for departure.
145. See supra Part III.B.
146. Even with drug addiction “there is an element of reasoned choice when an addict
knowingly acquires and uses drugs; he could instead have participated in an addiction
treatment program.” United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1984).
147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3.
148. Id. § 5K2.12.
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gamblers steal money not to gamble but to pay off gambling debts. The
motive in such cases is economic need, not a compulsive need. For
example, in United States v. Rosen,149 the trial court rejected a request
for downward departure where the defendant committed theft in order
to pay off a home equity loan.150 The loan was taken out to pay off
gambling debts but the court noted that the Sentencing Commission
prohibited departures based on personal financial difficulties.151 A need
for money is hardly a novel motive, even if a more powerful one
because of the addiction.
In sum, one of the primary goals of the Guidelines was to
promote uniformity and fairness.152 Downward departures based on
gambling addictions undermine this goal. To make gambling
addiction an encouraged factor for departure creates an unprincipled
distinction between it and the Guidelines’ treatment of drug and
alcohol use, economic need, and mental and emotional conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Gambling addictions are real and tragic, and current social policy
only encourages this dreadful phenomenon while doing little to treat
it. However, punishment should comport with culpability. The
evidence suggests that compulsive gamblers do not have an impaired
ability to obey the law. Thus, when a judge grants a downward
departure to a pathological gambler he may be simply pardoning the
common criminal who simply has a powerful motive to steal. A
“more compelling motive . . . is not the kind of direct causation

149. 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Askari,
140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 790.
151. The trial court also found that “there was no link between compulsive gambling and
criminal behavior.” Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791 n.2. The court in Roach also noted the conflict
between the diminished capacity guideline and the prohibition of departures based on
economic need when defendants steal money to satisfy a compulsion, but the Roach court did
not resolve the issue since it was not raised. United States v. Roach, 296 F.3d 565, 571 n.4
(7th Cir. 2002).
152. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996); see supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
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between mental capacity and commission of the offense envisioned”
by the diminished capacity guideline.153
Justin W. Starr

153. Venezia v. United States, 884 F. Supp 919, 926 (D.N.J. 1995).
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